In this paper I shall defend a controversial thesis concerning the analysis of dispositional attributions. According to this thesis, which I call the entailment thesis (ET), it'is a necessary truth that if a physical object x has a disposition d, then x has some intrinsic characteristic or characterotics in virtue of which it has d.
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There is a short way of answering these objections: one can simply deny the possibilities on which they are premised.
Those who take a Humean or generalist view of causation and of natural laws would probably reject out of hand the possibility of there being two objects with all the same intrinsic characteristics but different dispositions. Certainly, the possibility of action at a distance is controversial, and anyone who rejects it would be on ground at least as firm as someone who accepts it. Finally, many philosophers have found it implausible that there could be basic physical objects; these philosophers have usually thought that there must be an infinity of kinds of particles.^ In the present paper I shall not take the short route in any of the three cases described above. Instead, I will argue that even if one grants the possibilities on which these three objections to ET are based, it does not follow that ET is false.
Hence, none of these objections are sufficient to refute ET.
In the first section of this paper I shall explicate ET. In the second section I will show that none of the objections described above are sufficient to refute ET.
Finally, I will argue that since none of these objections succeed, and since a limited version of ET which applies only to standard cases of dispositional attribution is clearly true, our acceptance of ET is warranted.
I
We may distinguish several different kinds of dispositions. A first distinction is between deterministic dispositions, or dispositions which are unfailingly manifested in the appropriate circumstances, and pröba-bilitistic dispositions, which are only sometimes manifested in the appropriate circumstances. A second distinction is between dispositions which may be manifested in several different ways and dispositions which may be manifested in only one way.
In this paper, in order to simplify matters, I shall concern myself only with deterministic dispositions which are singlymanifested.
Similarly, while dispositions may be attributed to individuals in varying degrees of specificity, I shall presuppose that an ideal specification has been made of (i) the circumstances C which are sufficient for the manifestation of a disposition d of an individual x, and (ii) the process jji which x undergoes when in C. According to the view which I will defend, if x has a disposition d to i^-in^-C, then there is a law of nature L which is expressed in terms of ^ and C, and which subsumes x. Therefore, C and tj^ are ideally specified just when they are specified to the degree required to fully state L.
Consider the following schema:
(1) At t, x is disposed to ^-in-C.
In (1), 'x' 't', 'jj^', and *C' are schematic letters, 'x* is to be replaced with a proper name denoting a physical object, ' t* with the name of a time, 'jp' with a process-predicate, and * C' with an expression describing a set of circumstances. 1 * I take (1) to be the paradigm form of dispositional attribution.
If an object has a (deterministic) disposition, then there is a law of nature in the offing.
In other words, dispositional attributions entail laws of nature or statements of physical necessity. where '•' means "it is physically necessary that", and where '<p' designates an intrinsic property of a physical object.
Since dispositional attributions entail laws, and since these laws provide nomically sufficient conditions for the dispositional attributions which entail them, it is a necessary truth that there is a nomically sufficient condition for a particular object's having a particular disposition. I need not commit myself here to any interpretation of nomic or physical necessity, but it is important that I make clear how one's understanding of the physical modalities has a bearing on the concerns of this paper. In what follows, I shall draw a distinction between general and non-general laws of nature, a distinction I will make use of in explicating ET. I will also show how this first distinction is related to a distinction between de diclo and de re statements of physical necessity.
On one view of laws of nature, which we may call the Hurnean or generalist view, it is a necessary truth that all laws of nature are gene ral.
Roughly speaking, a law of nature is general just when it can be expressed by a universally quantified sentence which makes no reference to any particular individual. Conversely, a law of nature is non-general just when it can only be expressed by a sentence which makes reference to some particular.
-On what may be called a realist view of laws of nature, we can quantify into causal contexts. An adequate interpretation of the resulting quantified causal logic implies that for every de dicto statement of physical necessity there is a corresponding statement de_ re.
7
For example, corresponding to the de_ dicto schema above is a schema de re: (v_) (y^ is physically necessarily such that: if y_~Ts <{>_ in C, then £ tj^' s > . A statement of physical necessity de re explicitly attributes a nomic property or properties to some individual or class individuals.
In the following discussion I will draw a distinction between two different relations in which laws of nature can stand to particulars. This distinction will then be used to distinguish two types of non-general laws. The first is the familar relation of nomic subsumption.
It can be defined as follows: I need not commit myself here to any interpretation of nomic or physical necessity, but it is important that I make clear how one's understanding of the physical modalities has a bearing on the concerns of this paper. In what follows, I shall draw a distinction between general and non-general laws of nature, a distinction I will make use of in explicating ET. I will also show how this first distinction is related to a distinction between de dicto and de re statements of physical necessity.
On one view of laws of nature, which we may call the Humean or generalist view, it is a necessary truth that all laws of nature are general.
Roughly speaking, ä law of nature is general just when it can be expressed by a universally quantified sentence which makes no reference to any particular individual.
Conversely In the following discussion I will draw a distinction between two different relations in which laws of nature can stand to particulars. This distinction will then be used to distinguish two types of non-general laws. The first is the familar relation of nomic subsumption.
It can be defined as follows: ET says that it is a matter of necessity that every disposition of an object have a basis in its intrinsic characteristics.
For this reason it is important to have an understanding of the notion of an IC or intrinsic characteristic of a physical object.
I shall say that an IC P of a physical object x is either (i) an essential property of x, or (ii) a contingent property of x which is necessarily such that x acquires or loses P if and only if x undergoes a change in parts or in arrangement of parts, i.e., in its structural/compositional properties.
This implies that the property of being next to something, for example, is not an IC of any physical object, for the location of another individual may entail that x acquire or lose this property. In a situation like this, when philosophers have different intuitions concerning conceptual claims, the proper procedure to follow in attempting to resolve the dispute is to appeal to some criterion or principle. I shall argue in Section III below that ET is clearly true for a large class of standard cases. In addition, a3 the preceding discussion has shown, S3 admits of an interpretation consistent with ET.. In these circumstances, if there are'no other reasons for preferring Mackie's interpretation of S3, then the fact that my interpretation of S3 enables us to formulate a uniform theory of dispositions while Mackie's does not puts the onus on Mackie to provide an unequivocal counterexample to ET based on the possibility of actioh at a distance. S3 is not such a counterexample.
A third kind of objection to ET is based on the possibility of there being basic physical objects. Before discussing this objection it will be helpful to elucidate the notions of a non-basic physical object and a basic physical object.
Non-basic physical objects are such that it is physically possible to break them into proper parts. The ICs of such objects that are relevant to their having dispositions are usually internal states. These internal states are structural/ compositional properties, the molecular, atomic, or subatomic make-ups of these objects.
Basic physical objects are such that it is not physically possible to break them into proper parts.15
They have no structural/compositional properties; therefore, if any entity of this sort has a disposition in virtue of having a certain IC, then this IC cannot be a structural/compositional property. William Alston's view is representative of the objection to ET based on the possibility of there being basic physical objects:
. . . we cannot claim that a dispositonal attribution entails the existence of a basis; it is not necessary that every disposition have a basis.
In particular, if there are atomic substances with no internal structure (and this would seem to be at least logically possible), they will undoubtedly have dispositions, for they will undoubtedly react in characteristic ways to certain conditions. But since they lack any internal structure, there can be no question of various features of their structure serving as the basis for various dispositions. Their dispositions will be ultimate properties. In its former guise, £ is the structural/compositional property of x which explains by characterizing a causal mechanism, why x £'s when <J> in C. For example, the molecular structure of salt, Tn the context of the atomic theory of matter, characterizes a causal mechanism whose workings explain why it is a law of nature that salt dissolves in water.
In its later guise, £ is the IC of x in virtue of which x has d. In this case, there is a law of nature which asserts that D(if x is £ in C, then x s) , or a law of nature which asserts that CJ~(y) (if y is ^ in C, then y jjl/s). This, together with the proposition that x is explains why x has d in the sense that it entails that x has d. An IC of an object can play the latter role withoutplaying the former, but not vice-versa. Hence, though it is true that the ICs of a basic physical object could not play the former role vis-a-vis the dispositions of that object, they could and would play the latter role vis-a-yis those dispositions. Since this is all that ET requires of the ICs of a basic physical objectnamely, that for every disposition d of a basic physical object x there is some one or more TCs of x in virtue of which it has .d--the possibility of there being basic physical objects is consistent with the truth of ET.
We have noted that if there were basic physical objects then the ICs in virtue of which they had their dispositions would not be structural/compositional properties. What sort of properties would they be? If all laws of nature were either general or DNLs , then the ICs in question would be sortal or natural kind properties, e.g., being a basic physical object, being a field of potential, being a photon. On the other hand, if there were NNLs involving basic individuals, 12'» then the ICs in virtue of which those individuals possessed their dispositions would be either the above sort of properties or else non-qualitative ICs, e.g. , the property of being identical with a, or the property of being that individual.
Ill
We have considered several objections to ET. I have shown that even if we concede the possibility of the states of affairs upon which these objections are based, their possibility is compatible with the truth of ET. Since there are no good objections to ET, there is no logical bar to our accepting it. Hence, we will be warranted in accepting ET if we can show that there are good reasons for making ET a part of our theory of dispositions. These reasons are as follows.
There is a broad class of dispositional attributions where ET clearly fits the facts. Consider a standard situation, i.e., a situation where an object x has a disposition d to ^-in-C, and where it is physically possible for x to be in C and not have d. As we have seen, x's having d entails that there is a law of nature~which subsumes x_. Since, by hypothesis, it is physically possible for x to be in C and fail to <J>, this law does not assert simply that Dtif x is in C, then x ty's), or that Q(y_) (if y is in C, they y_ •£* s). Rather, x's having d entails that (e<}0[Tx is £) & O (if x is <£. in C, then x £'s) v (y_) (If y_ is £ in C, then y_ £'s)) ] , where $ is an IC* In other words, in standard cases of the sort described, x's having d entails that x has an IC in virute of which it has d, and ET is true at least for those cases. Therefore, any consistent theory of dispositions which implies that dispositional attributions entail laws, i.e.,any nomological theory of dispositions, implies a version of ET which pertains at least to this standard class of cases. While some of the critics of ET concede the plausibility of a version of ET which has limited scope, they object to extending this limited version to include certain non-standard cases, namely, the cases we have examined above (Mackie, p. 133). Since we must accept a limited version of ET in any case, an adequate nomological theory of dispositions can provide a uniform analysis of dispositional attributions only if it entails ET. Because of this , and because none of the objections to ET succeed, our acceptance of ET is warranted, and it is reasonale to conclude that ET is part of the analysis of dispositional attributions. Whenever I use one of these letters schematically, I follow this convention for its replacement. For example, if ' x' is used schematically, then it is to be replaced with a proper name denoting an individual with a predicate, and so forth.
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More specifically, it is a necessary truth that if an object x has a disposition d, then there is a nomically sufficient condition for x 1 s having d.
Whenever I employ a law-schema such as this, I intend that the reader understand it to be implicitly temporally quantified.
For example, this schema should be read as "it is physically necessary that (y_) (O (if at t, y, is £ in C, then at A;t y s)", where t is suitably later than ;t. 
